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Introduction 
Tuesday, the 12th of June 2018, will go into history as the unprecedented day the American president Donald 
J. Trump and the North-Korean leader Kim Jong-Un shook hands (Tan, 2018). All eyes of the world were 
focussed on this much anticipated event. The stage for this significant operation is Sentosa Island, Singapore. 
Whilst media, experts, and citizens of the world are contemplating the process and results of the meeting 
itself, most are not consciously preoccupied with the host country. Yet, the choice for Singapore as host, was 
definitely not a coincidence.  
Being able to administer an event like this is quite remarkable for a small island state like Singapore, 
considering the amount of preparation and resources necessary. Not to mention that Singapore has only been 
an independent state for 53 years, in which it shifted from third-world outpost to first-world hub. Over this 
short period, it has transformed into a state able to handle a historic event like the Trump-Kim meeting, with 
regard to all aspects varying form security measures to financial coverage (Tan, 2018). 
Apart from the state’s ability, the willingness to actively participate in the global system — whether 
on political or economical levels — is noteworthy. In the case of this event, Singapore’s diplomatic ties with 
both states involved, as well as the active lobbying of its designated institutions, should not be overlooked. 
Additionally, this recent political peace-building endeavor does not stand on itself, as Singapore has shown 
more signs of ambitious foreign policy over the years of its  short  independent existence (Leifer,  2000). 
Allegedly, this ambition delivers, as it is accompanied by unrivaled growth (Leifer, 2000, pp.17-18; Easterly 
& Kraay, 2000, p.2019)
This international behavior and growth are quite uncommon for a small state, and classical theories, 
which dominate small state foreign policy research, often struggle to explain these empiric observations 
(Leifer, 2000, pp.18-19; Elman, 1995, p.172). Small states are expected to be reactive, not proactive, when it 
comes to  foreign policy formation (Hey,  2003,  p.6).  There  are  theories  however,  that  could provide an 
explanation for the way small states cope with their vulnerabilities. 
According to Miriam Elman, as demonstrated in her classic article The Foreign Policies of Small 
States (1995), domestic factors cannot be left out of the equation when researching small state foreign policy. 
She recommends future research to follow an institutional approach, including both system (exogenic) and 
domestic  (endogenic)  factors.  This  raises  the  question  whether  the  deviant  international  behavior  of 
Singapore, and its accompanying success, can be accounted for using Elman’s institutional approach.
By applying Elman’s (1995) historical institutionalist approach to the case of Singapore, this thesis 
aims to achieve a twofold of goals. Firstly, explaining Singapore’s remarkable foreign policy, and secondly, 
testing Elman’s theoretical framework on an authoritarian state. Ideally, this could pave the way to a greater 
understanding of small state foreign policy and its impact domestically and internationally.   
!3
Classical theories on small states
Research within the field of international relations has traditionally favored larger states,  resulting in an 
underrepresentation of  small  states in classic literature.  The category of  ‘small  states’ — or also ‘small 
powers’ — was essentially created for capturing all states that did not have a significant impact on the global 
system (Neumann & Gstöhl, 2006, p.5). They were deemed to inconsequential for the creation of widely 
applicable theories and were therefore largely ignored (Neumann & Gstöhl, 2006, p.5). Additionally, as small 
states did not represent a substantial portion of the world’s population, motivation for their research was 
further diminished. Consequently, the structural exclusion of small states has created a data deficiency within 
the  discipline.  Considering that  valuable  information could,  potentially,  be  gathered from these  atypical 
cases, it would be a missed opportunity to keep labeling them trivial.  
The  indisposition  towards  the  small  state  does  not  imply  that  no  research  has  been  done. 
Nonetheless, classical scholars tend towards the same conclusions of weakness and unimportance (Elman, 
1995).  For  realists,  this  is  mainly  due  to  the  inherent  focus  on  systemic  factors  in  their  analysis.  In 
combination with envisioning military abilities as indication of power, this focus causes small states to be 
regarded as unsustainable constructions. Consequently, their foreign policy is often described as passive and 
reactive, in contrast to the proactive influence of larger powers (Hey, 2003, p.6). Domestic factors such as the 
impact of institutions or leaders on the foreign policy of small states are dismissed by realists, creating the 
image of a state that has no influence and is moved around at the will of larger powers (Hey, 2003, p.6). 
These  classical  ideas  assume  the  fate  of  small  states  is  therefore  directly  linked  to  the  larger  powers’ 
benevolence.
The system level of analysis realists use for explaining small state foreign policy goes not without 
underlying logic. Arguably, it would not be easy for a small state with little resources to instate an army able 
to counteract that of a large power. Combine this with the classical proposition that large powers are likely to 
use  their  acquired  military  power  eventually,  and  the  first  obstacle  inhibiting  small  state  survival  is 
established (Browning, 2006, p.672). As a consequence, small states are said to be constantly preoccupied 
with their survival, thus the international system is assumed to be the most relevant level for the analysis of 
small  state  behavior  (Elman,  1995,  p.175).  In  contrast,  great  powers  are  expected to  have more  policy 
options due to larger levels of resources. As small states’ foreign behavior is simply expected to reflect the 
international order, realists deem the sole analysis of system factors sufficient (Elman, 1995, p.177).
In the liberal discourse, it is argued that a state’s power is not just a reflection of military capabilities. 
Their focus lies more on economical interdependence between states and the power relations that creates 
(Ganesan, 2005, p.5).  When it comes to small states, liberal theory suggests that — due to the deficiency of 
territory, resources and a substantial domestic market — small states are unable to run an economy of scale, 
resulting in vulnerable economies that rely heavily on other states  (Neumann & Gstöhl, 2006, p.11). A small 
state’s dependence on larger states creates an “asymmetrical interdependence” (Keohane, 1977). This affects 
the bargaining power of small states, as the stakes for economic survival are high, whilst the economies of 
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larger states are not that easily disrupted. For liberals, these arguments also reinforce the focus on system 
factors, causing system-centric research to dominate the discipline.
The system-centric  dominance observed in the classical  theories,  in  combination with presumed 
military and economic dependency, ultimately results in the classical theories’ argument that small states 
have little influence internationally. Consequently, it can be established that, according to classical theories, 
the unfortunate international position that small states hold, forces them to show system based behavior. In 
reaction to a critical situation of immediate threat, this would most likely be in the form of alliance building. 
According to Walt for example, Small states will often be forced to bandwagon — even if this is not their 
domestically preferred action — for the sole purpose of state survival (Walt, 1987, p.24; Elman, 1995, p.
177).
Coping with small state vulnerability
In contrast to realism however, liberals do not dismiss small states as unviable. Due to the focus on 
cooperative behavior instead of competitive behavior, a small state’s vulnerability can be greatly reduced 
(Ganesan,  2005,  p.6).  Additionally,  liberal  theories  acknowledge  instances  of  complex  interdependence 
between states. Liberals argue that this interdependence can prevent war, because trade is more profitable 
than war (Copeland, 1996, p.8). In the modern age, peaceful trade and integration into the global market 
brings less risk and more profit than simply conquering territory by force (Copeland, 1996, p.9). Assuming 
that  states  and  their  leaders  act  rationally,  the  choice  for  trade  over  war  should  be  made.  Economical 
interdependence does not take economical competition between countries away, and yet it can only exist 
within a cooperative framework where war is uncommon (Ganesan, 2005, p.8; Copeland, 1996, p.9). For 
small  states,  this  cooperation  is  of  vital  importance,  as  war  with  larger  powers  can  be  detrimental.  If 
economic cooperation is possible, a state’s smallness can often be seen as issue specific, whilst the state 
could potentially excel in other areas — such as small but oil rich countries — creating power in these 
specific economic spheres of the global system (Browning, 2006, p.672). 
The reduction of vulnerability can also be observed in neorealist and liberal institutionalist theories 
as  they  acknowledge  the  influence  of  international  institutions  (Ganesan,  2005,  p.6).  Small  states  are 
expected to support these international initiatives as they can provide them with opportunities to influence 
the international system and protect themselves from larger powers (Browning, 2006, p.672). Being part of 
international institutions also provides small states with the option to embed themselves within a broader 
global  community,  reducing  the  reliance  on  —  and  influence  of  —  immediate  regional  neighbors. 
Additionally, international institutions can increase a small state’s security by providing fora for conflict 
resolution and the articulation of international rules and values. These theories provide some tools to ease 
small state vulnerability, and increase their viability in the international system. It is, however, even though 
vulnerability  can  be  coped  with,  not  common  for  small  states  to  thrive  and  actively  influence  the 
international system on a global scale.  
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Introducing domestic factors
Despite most odds seemingly against an active role in global politics, empiric studies show that some small 
states manage to thrive in the international system, and in fact proactively influence it. As Easterly and Kraay 
argued, ‘We find that small states have, if anything, significantly higher per capita income than others in their 
region’ and they add that ‘there is no significant difference in growth performance between large and small 
states’ (Easterly & Kraay, 2000, p.2024). Singapore is among the small states researched by Easterly and 
Kraay, and even tops the charts of per capita growth between 1960 and 1995 (Easterly & Kraay, 2000, p.
2019). It clearly sails well on the anarchic seas of the international system, despite of its size. Apparently, 
there are states which are small,  yet paradoxically show increasing success and foreign influence.
These empirical observations are not easily explained by classical theories and their state centric 
focus, and therefore expose an explanatory problem. Apparently, there are other variables — besides the 
international system — interacting with the foreign policy behavior of small states. A possible reason for this 
can be that  domestic factors actually do influence the formation of small  state foreign policy.  Although 
domestic factors are classically dismissed because of a small state’s assumed reactive foreign policy, there 
could be instances where this is to straightforward.
In her article, The foreign Policies of Small States: Challenging Neorealism in Its Own Backyard, 
Miriam Elman argues that this is indeed the case, and challenges the scholarly consensus by arguing that 
foreign policy formation cannot be separated from domestic factors a priori (Elman, 1995, p.175). 
According to Elman, neither system nor domestic factors can be theoretically prioritized when it comes to 
small state behavior, and the complex causality of factors can only be exposed by empirical research (Elman, 
1995, p.217). This implies the possibility of small states which foreign policies are shaped by both domestic 
and system factors.  Therefore,  to get a complete overview of the causal pathways that form small  state 
foreign policy, it is essential that one also includes domestic factors.
In order to achieve the inclusion of domestic factors, without missing vital parts of the domestic 
interplay, the use of a comprehensive and advanced domestic theory is key. Elman (1995, p.180) argues that 
both state-centric, as well as society-centric theories, do not account for the complex interaction of factors 
and  are  therefore  insufficient  to  obtain  the  comprehensive  research  desired.  Instead,  a  historical 
institutionalist approach would be more appropriate, as it  highlights both the constraints and options for 
society and government (Elman, 1995, p.181). 
Historical institutionalism is a powerful theory for the inclusion of domestic factors, as it focusses on 
the domestic political structure and the way this structure influences policymaking. By taking both policy 
constraints and the possible absence of these constrains in account, a more detailed explanation can be given 
of a states policy output. Especially in the case of a small state, where elite politics regularly dominate the 
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political domain, the absence of constrains can be an explanation for unconventional policy output.  Within 
historical institutionalism, a sense of time and sequence stands central, and it is assumed that the order of 
events can influence a political process (Fioretos, 2011, p.371). This adds the possibility to analyze causal 
inferences,  which  can  be  especially  advantageous  when  trying  to  explain  a  state’s  foreign  policy. 
Additionally, historical institutionalism adds the notion of policy paradigms, whereby institutions are shaped 
after specific policy goals or a set of principles. Observing such a policy paradigm can potentially form a 
domestic explanation for continued policy output which cannot be explained by exogenic variables (Fioretos, 
2011, p.375). 
Although  domestic  factors  are  key  in  explaining  foreign  policy  in  historical  institutionalism, 
exogenic factors still play an important role (Fioretos, 2011, p.373; Elman, 1995, p.182). Elman argues that 
institutional formation and change is subject to exogenic influences, which Fioretos refers to as ‘exogenous 
shock’, and Elman herself describes as a period of crisis (Fioretos, 2011, p.373). The domestic institutions 
themselves will in turn have long lasting impact on the constraints and options for future policymakers in the 
form of  policy paradigms (Fioretos,  2011,  p.375).  Thus,  it  is  necessary to study the formation of  these 
governance structures, in order to understand future policy that flows from these structures (Elman, 1995, p.
182). The most critical changes to the state’s institutions, those directly influencing the future trajectory of 
the state, are most likely to occur during periods of crisis. These periods rearrange bargaining power across 
domestic groups, potentially leading to institutional reform (Elman, 1995, p.183).
In previous research, scholars have included system factors influencing institutional formation, and 
yet these have mostly been endogenic factors like colonial rule or defeat in war (Elman, 1995, p.183). Actual 
exogenic factors, like the configuration of the international system, are rarely considered when analyzing 
institutional design. Additionally, as stated by Elman (1995, p.184), ‘little attention has been devoted to how 
international factors,  such as the threat  of invasion or war,  may influence the bargaining game between 
government and opposition’. Many studies therefore fail to define the direct influence of the international 
system, on the regime that emerges (Elman, 1995, p.184). 
Not including the impact of an exogenous shock can create a deficit in the understanding of causal 
pathways, as exogenic threats can influence priorities of political actors who form the state’s institutions. 
Since, in times of crisis, state survival is most likely the top priority, institutions will be formed around the 
goal of facilitating this survival (Elman, 1995, p.184; Ganesan, 2005, p.2). Thus, ‘the external environment 
influences  domestic  political  development  by  altering  the  relative  credibility  of  competing  institutional 
alternatives (Elman, 1995, pp.184-185). Historical development and transitional periods such as times of 
crisis or an ‘exogenous shock’, can therefore have a considerable impact on later policy.
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Research question
The main purpose of this research is to decipher and explain the atypical Singaporean foreign behavior that 
can be empirically observed. The deviant nature  of Singapore’s foreign policy comes from it being a small 
state, and showing unexpected behavior and influence for a small state, according to classical theories. In an 
attempt to explain this deviancy, this thesis will  incorporate domestic factors by using an institutionalist 
approach. In explaining Singaporean behavior in world politics, this research could hold valuable lessons for 
other small states which are still defining their place in the international system, whilst trying to cope with 
their vulnerability and limited influence.
Secondly, the framework of Elman is tested on the case of Singapore. She suggests that her model of 
domestic influence is best tested on a ‘least likely case’ — a small state — as this is where classical theory’s 
explanatory  power  usually  excels  (Elman,  1995,  p.172).  Additionally,  she  states  that  her  framework  is 
especially suitable for explaining a democratic state’s international behavior (Elman, 1995, p.180). By using 
the case of Singapore, a small, as well as authoritarian state has been chosen. If Elman’s framework holds in 
relation to the Singaporean case, it could say something about the model’s validity. Consequently, it could be 
used to increase the understanding of  foreign behavior  as  exhibited by other  small  states.  The research 
question  emerging  on  the  basis  of  these  goals  is  therefore:  Why does  Singapore  show deviant  foreign 
behavior, and can this behavior be explained by the institutionalist framework of Elman?
Expectations
Keeping the formerly discussed literature and theories in mind, it can be expected that the Singaporean state 
has found a way to decrease or eliminate its innate vulnerabilities within the international system. Within 
realist theory this seems an impossible task, while liberals argue that complex economical interdependence 
can indeed decrease a small states vulnerability. However, although interdependence would make war less 
common, even liberals argue that an asymmetrical dependence would still be present, decreasing the small 
state’s vulnerability, but not giving it any active say in world politics. 
Neorealist and liberal institutionalist theories do accept and include the influence of international 
institutions in their reasoning. A state like Singapore would be expected to embrace international institutions, 
as it can embed it in the international community. Having access to these fora can provide a small state with 
new ways to increase security and economical relations. International institutions also amplify a small state’s 
ability to express their principles and values to other states, securing their own position within the system. 
Considering Singapore’s success, it can be expected that Singapore has also embraced membership in these 
international fora to improve its position internationally. 
In order to get a better and more complete picture of a small state’s foreign policy however, Elman 
(1995) suggest that a historical institutionalist perspective on the case is necessary. Within this institutionalist 
framework, the influence of domestic institutional structure is added to the analysis, and this in turn will 
provide a complete picture of the foreign policy situation.  According to this theory,  we can expect that 
!8
Singapore’s  domestic  institutional  structures  were  shaped  by  exogenic  (international  system  based) 
influences. Subsequently, we would expect these domestic institutional structures to influence Singapore’s 
foreign policy output. This would happen as institutional structures in Singapore both confine and enable its 
policymakers  in  different  areas,  thereby  influencing  the  state’s  foreign  policy  direction  (Elman,  1995). 
Consequently, domestic institutional structures would form the explanation of why Singapore shows atypical 
foreign  behavior.   According  to  Elman  (1995),  we  can  expect  historical  institutionalism to  be  a  better 
indicator  of  small  state  foreign  policy  than  classical  theories.  Additionally,  we  can  expect  endogenic 
influences to be the largest influencer of a state’s foreign policy.
Conceptualization & Operationalization
For this research to produce valuable results, it is key that a few concepts are clearly defined. The following 
segment  of  this  thesis  therefore  focusses  on  defining  the  concepts  of  the  small  and  authoritarian  state. 
Subsequently, definitions for the concepts of institution, exogenic and endogenic will be given, as these are 
central concepts that are being used for the analysis.
Defining when a state is  classified to be small  or  authoritarian is  necessary in order to identify 
whether Singapore falls within the confines of these definitions. The first step in this process is to define the 
concept of a state. Whether a polity is a state can be established by its membership of the United Nations. 
Only sovereign states can be members, therefore, if a polity is a member, it can be officially categorized as a 
state (United Nations Charter, 2018). Singapore joined the United Nations a month after its independence in 
1965, and can therefore from that moment on be seen as an independent and sovereign state (Leifer, 2000, p.
11).
Whether a state is considered small is less unambiguous, and open to heated debate (Browning, 
2006, p.670). Researchers base their definition on various factors, including population size, territory, natural 
resources and GDP. In this thesis, the focus for defining smallness will be on population and territorial size, 
in  relation  to  neighboring  states.  The  reason  for  using  these  markers  is  the  illustration  of  inherent 
vulnerability of a state in its regional environment (Kurečić, 2017). By comparing a state to it’s neighbors, 
the relativity of the concept of ‘smallness’ can be retained (Neumann & Gstöhl, 2006, p.6).
Comparing Singapore’s current population of 5,6 million to that of states in its direct proximity — 
Malaysia: 31 million, Indonesia: 261 million, Thailand: 68.9 million — illustrates this vulnerability (Index 
Mundi, 2018; SingstatPopulation, 2018).  
A comparison of the second most common indicator, state territory, only reinforces this image of smallness. 
With  a  territory  of  719 square  kilometers,  Singapore  is  dwarfed by Malaysia  (330,800 km2),  Indonesia 
(1,811,570 km2) and Thailand (513,120 km2)(Index Mundi, 2018). Due to this lack of space, the influence of 
Singapore’s  natural  resources  on  its  GDP lie  somewhere  between  0.001  and  0% (Index  Mundi,  2018). 
Furthermore, the Singaporean population is of mostly ethnically Chinese descent, and the state is located 
within  the  broader  context  of  a  Muslim Malay-Indonesian  archipelago distrustful  of  the  ethnic-Chinese 
Singaporeans (Ganesan, 2005, p.1; Leifer, 2000, p.12). Combining the state’s relatively small population and 
!9
territory with the distrust of its direct neighbors shows the innate vulnerability Singapore has to cope with. 
For this reason, Singapore can be viewed as a small state.
For defining an authoritarian state, this thesis will use the guidelines stipulated by Juan Linz in his 
book Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Linz, 2000). Linz claims that an authoritarian regime can be 
recognized by  a set of indicators. Firstly, limited political pluralism, normally in the form of a small group 
of leaders while other interest groups are being ignored, often in the form of one party rule. Furthermore, a 
political legitimacy based on the necessity of strong political leadership to combat societal problems or state 
vulnerability. Finally, constrained social mobilization and the suppression of political opponents. In the case 
of Singapore, the state is ruled by one party, the People’s Action Party (PAP). The legitimization of the PAP 
seem to come mostly from expressing the state’s vulnerability, and adding that this can only be overcome by 
unambiguous politics (Lee, 2011, pp. 3-11). Finally, social mobilization is constrained by so called OB ‘out 
of bound’ markers to dictate what topics are to sensitive for public discussion (Yang, 2002, p.2), and political 
opponents have been suppressed (Lee, 1998). We can therefore confidently determine that Singapore is an 
authoritarian state. 
The concept ‘institution’ will also be defined as it plays a prominent role. This thesis will follow the 
definition as given by Hodgson (2006), who argues that institutions are ‘systems of established and prevalent 
social  rules that  structure social  interactions’.  Hodgson adds that  ‘institutions both constrain and enable 
behavior’ arguing that ‘regulation is not always the antithesis of freedom; it can be its ally’. Following this 
conceptualization, structures of social interaction within the Singaporean state can be analyzed in the search 
for a foreign policy explanation. The idea that an institution can be both confining and enabling also follows 
the guidelines of Elman and historic institutionalism, in the sense that institutional structure can have lasting 
impact on policy decisions (Fioretos, 2011). 
The final concepts that fulfill a central role in this thesis are endogenic and exogenic. These concepts 
are used to categorize influences on foreign policy into two distinct categories. Endogenic influences are 
those  that  originate  domestically,  from  within  the  state’s  borders.  These  factors  can  come  from  both 
government, society, or domestic institutions within the state of analysis. Exogenic influences, on the other 
hand, are influences that originate from outside the state. These influences cannot be controlled by the state’s 
government,  and  mostly  originate  from  other  states  or  the  global  political  system.  Although  exogenic 
influences cannot be directly controlled, a government can react to these influences by policy formation. The 
divide between endogenic and exogenic influences is important to this research, as endogenic influences on 
foreign policy mostly indicate an active role for a state,  whilst exogenic influences on policy indicate a 
reactive role (Hey, 2003, p.6). 
Research design and methodology
!10
This thesis will  present a qualitative,  single case study of Singapore’s foreign policy and behavior.  The 
choice for a single case design depends on both the choice for a deviant case analysis and the use of process 
tracing for the analysis. Both these research methods will now be further rationalized. Firstly, this research is 
based on the deviant case analysis (Wicks, 2010; Seawright & Gerring, 2008, pp. 302-303). Singapore’s 
foreign policy does not seem to follow expectations defined by classical theories, and this thesis tries to 
explain this anomaly. An advantage of a deviant case analysis, is that the research can add to theoretical 
saturation (Wicks, 2010, p.2). By researching an atypical case, international relations theories can be better 
understood, contributing to future understanding of cases that do not comply with the preexisting literature. 
Apart  from  theoretical  saturation  and  the  creation  of  generalizable  theories,  one  would  also  like  to 
understand the atypical cases themselves, to explain what makes them ‘counter theoretical’(Wicks, 2010, p.
2).  Deviant  case  analyses  can  therefore  lead  us  to  a  better  understanding of  international  relations  and 
solidify international relations theory. However, when applying this method, it is essential to study the right 
sources and to interpret findings correctly. It is necessary to analyze a rich amount of factors whilst balancing 
this with the principle of parsimony, not to come to false conclusions of deviancy. For this purpose, this 
research will use both academic sources and primary sources to capture Singapore’s situation in detail, while 
interpreting this data as close to existing theory as possible.
Secondly, and to enable aforementioned, the research will be conducted according to the method of 
Process Tracing (PT). The strength of this method lies within the applicability to the analysis of behavioral 
patterns  (Loyens,  2014,  p.35).  By including processes,  rather  than only stipulating correlations between 
variables, a more refined model can be created that — in contrast to other research methods — is able to 
include causal inference (Loyens, 2014, pp.35-36).  Exactly this causal inference is what gives historical 
institutionalism its  explanatory  power,  hence  the  choice  for  this  method in  this  thesis  (Fioretos,  2011). 
Furthermore, PT is a form of within-case analysis, thus the need for a single case study. Additionally, content 
analysis will be used back the PT model by providing the information needed. Sources include scientific 
literature,  media articles,  official  documents from international  organizations as well  as the Singaporean 
government and memoirs of Singaporean nationals. These sources are individually selected on their ability to 
complement  the  iterative  process  of  PT.  The information derived from these  sources  is  used to  form a 
complete and historically accurate picture of Singapore’s political, economical and societal development. 
Hereafter, the information is arranged to use as ‘pieces of the causal puzzle’ (Loyens, 2014, p.34).
The analysis will start with elemental information about the case of Singapore, whereafter foreign 
policy  influences  will  be  structured  according  to  their  exogenic  or  endogenic  origin.  In  doing  so,  both 
external  and  internal  influences  on  Singapore’s  foreign  policy  will  be  mapped  structurally  to  ease  the 
interpretation of this data. The timeframe within which these policy influences will be examined starts in 
1965, as this is the year that Singapore became an independent state. Making use of a longitudinal analysis, 
and  going  back  to  this  date,  is  essential  to  collect  the  necessary  information  for  testing  the  historical 
institutionalist framework as stipulated by Elman. This is because the first years of independence is when the 
development of a state’s institutional structures has most likely taken place (Leifer, 2000, pp.19-20).
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After the influences on foreign policy have been analyzed, they will be interpreted with — and linked back to 
— the existing literature, with as goal to find an adequate answer to the research question. Now the thesis 
will continue with the analysis. 
Analysis: the Singaporean case
Singapore is a small island state located at the southern tip of peninsular Malaysia, between the Strait of 
Malakka and the South-China Sea. With its territory of around 700km2, it is a dot on the map of Southeast-
Asia compared to its sizable neighbors Malaysia and Indonesia (Singstats, 2018). Despite of its small size, it 
is  densely populated with  a  total  population of  5,6  million inhabitants,  of  which 3,4  million Singapore 
citizens (Singstats, 2018). The territory used to be a British (crown)colony and was founded by Sir Stamford 
Raffles in 1819 (Witting, 1953) . Later, in 1963 Singapore became part of the federation of Malaysia, but this 
construction did not hold for long. The city-state is now considered to be one of the Asian economic tigers, 
but the situation was very different around 1965, when Singapore gained full independence. Singapore’s way 
to independence, as unilateral eviction by the federation of Malaysia will form the starting point of this 
analysis.
Exogenic influences on Singapore’s foreign policy
The 1960s in Singapore were characterized by political  and racial  turmoil,  accompanied by economical 
downfall, unemployment and low living standards. When Harry Lee, commonly known as Lee Kuan Yew, 
won the general elections with his newly formed Peoples Action Party (PAP) in 1959, he knew there was a 
lot of work to do (Lee, 2011, pp.3-9). Political stability is crucial for any state, yet particularly for a small 
state. To counter its vulnerability, it has to be stable to attract foreign capital and built a sustainable future for 
its population. Additionally, good relations with neighboring countries are key, and this can only be achieved 
by internal political unanimity. However,  this is a goal especially hard to fulfill  for a state as culturally 
diverse  as  Singapore,  with  an  ethnic  make-up  of  primarily  Chinese,  but  also  Malay,  Indian,  Western-
Europeans and some additional small ethnic minorities (Singstats, 2018). 
Singapore gave up its independence to form a political unity with Malaya, to form the new Malaysia.
What was meant to be a road to political stability, quickly turned out to be a fall towards racial violence in 
the streets of Singapore. The delicate ethnical balance between the Chinese and Malay communities had been 
disrupted. Although lee’s PAP opted for laws that would put the different ethnical communities on an equal 
pedestal, Tunku Abdul Rahman, the prime minister of Malaysia, had different plans to secure the Malay 
interests. The intrinsically different vision of both political leaders only worsened the tension. Although Lee 
kept good hope in managing the situation, Tunku Abdul Rahman decided, unilaterally, to eject Singapore 
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from the Federation of Malaysia in August 1965 (Lee, 1998, p.648). Prime minister Lee’s plan of a political 
union had failed miserably, and Singapore lost its hinterland permanently. 
From that moment on, Singapore stood alone in the international system, and this sudden change was 
a traumatic experience for the newly independent state. After Singapore became independent unwillingly, its 
vulnerability was emphasized in foreign media, as well as by the Prime Minister himself (Lee, 2011, pp.3-4). 
The traumatic  experience of  being suddenly  cast  out  of  the  political  union with  Malaya was  internally 
experienced — and actively branded — as an argument for drastic action in order to overcome the state’s 
vulnerability  in  the  international  system.  Considering  the  circumstances  under  which  Singapore  gained 
independence, the PAP concluded that its sovereignty and future could never be taken for granted.
Its international vulnerability was quickly installed as the leading focus of the state’s foreign policy 
(Leifer, 2000, p.17). Unsurprisingly, one of the first steps by Prime Minister Lee was appointing a competent 
minister, Goh Keng Swee, to consolidate the state’s new armed forces and lead the ministry of interior and 
defense. By combining interior and defense, police forces and army could work closely together (Lee, 2011, 
p.6). The Israeli model of national service was taken on and Israel helped train the new army in exchange for 
recognition (Leifer, 2000, pp.20-21). Up to this day, Singapore’s government spends a fixed percentage of 
the GNP on their defense budged, and continues to modernize and improve its military equipment (Leifer, 
2000, p.111). Singapore’s continued dedication can also be illustrated by its defense budget in 1999, which 
amounted to 4.2 billion US dollars, three times the amount Indonesia spent on defense in that same year 
(Leifer, 2000, p.20). 
Singapore’s eviction from the Federation of Malaysia left it alone in a region full of bigger powers 
with different  interests  than itself,  forming the first  exogenic influence on its  foreign policy as a newly 
independent state. The military policy flowing from this influence is based on a competitive and anarchic 
worldview with as goal the acquisition of greater military power. Consequently, realism can be seen as the 
underlying ideology. The situation the Singaporean government found itself in was understandably alarming, 
making the choice for a rigid military strategy reasonable. However, the amount of resources accounted to 
defense  are  noteworthy for  a  small  state,  and the  continued investments  would  not  have been possible 
without the state’s acquired economic prosperity.
Comparing this data to Elman’s historical institutionalist model, it can be argued that the continuing 
focus on military power is a product of institutional formation. The institutional structures formed right after 
the traumatic experience of being a city state in a region of large powers still influence the military spending 
of modern Singapore. On the other hand, the threat of its larger neighbors is not yet gone, meaning that the 
continued military spending can be both explained by institutional structures (from a historical institutionalist 
perspective)  and  the  current  regional  situation  (from a  realist  perspective).  Looking  at  statements  from 
Singaporean officials however, it becomes clear that the state’s regional vulnerability with regards to territory 
and sovereignty is still seen as an issue, needing constant vigilance and military investments.
Considering the exogenic influence of the regional political system, military strategy forms the core 
of the Singaporean foreign policy (Ganesan, 2005). And yet, the state has also found other ways to cope with 
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its vulnerable souvernty and territory. Accepting the fate of independence and trying to make the best of it, 
other international political connections were sought after. The first step was to apply for membership at the 
United Nations (UN), which was quickly granted to Singapore in September 1965 (Lee, 2011, p.6). Even 
though Singapore also joined other, more regional initiatives like ASEAN, the UN has been the governments 
favorite international forum for expressing its principles(Ganesan, 2005, p.17). By clearly and continually 
stating the importance of souvernty and the preservation of territory, the Singaporean government defends its 
interests. By showing their presence in the international community, Singapore validates its position and 
identity as a sovereign state which borders and interests should be respected. The state’s presence in these 
international organizations can be linked back to a liberal institutionalist approach, however, this policy acts 
as an additional layer to the state’s realist focus on military power, and will therefore not replace the latter 
anytime soon. Singaporean officials keep stressing the importance of military power to secure the state’s 
souvernty,  even whilst  Singapore’s presence can be clearly felt  in international organizations,  like when 
Singapore took a  nonpermanent seat in the UN Security Council in 2001 (Ganesan, 2005, p.14).
Apart from the territorial vulnerability, there is the exogenic influence of economic dependency.
A state  the  size  of  Singapore,  lacking  natural  resources,  has  to  rely  on  trade  with  other  states  for  its 
economical  success  and  the  welfare  of  the  population  (Leifer,  2000,  p.18).  The  inherent  economic 
interdependence with other states forms an exogenic influence on Singapores foreign policy, as it adds to the 
state’s vulnerability by affecting its international bargaining position(Leifer, 2000, p.18). If Singapore were 
to fall  into a severely asymmetric dependency with its  neighboring countries,  it  could directly effect its 
citizen’s welfare. 
An example of this is Singapore’s reliance on drinking water from Malaysia (Lee, 2011). Without 
proper policy and arrangements securing the access to clean drinking water, society would be disrupted.  As 
an answer to this dependency, Singapore’s government has put many resources into managing and obtaining 
good economic relations abroad, and guiding the country to economic success. To improve and diversify the 
state’s trade links, Singapore’s doctrine has been to accept and pursue trade with any country open to it. In 
doing so, the state essentially divided its diplomatic ties and economic diplomacy into separate policies with 
separate goals (Ganesan, 2005). This is definitely not a typical thing to do, and has caused foreign critique, 
yet is is legitimized by addressing the states vulnerability. Again the articulation of vulnerability seems to 
play  a  prominent  role  as  former  prime  minister  Lee  Kuan  Yew stated:  ‘A consciousness  of  an  innate 
vulnerability has promoted a culture of competitiveness through which Singapore has excelled’(Lee Kuan 
Yew 1996, in Leifer, 2000, p.18). In order to guarantee a continuous flow of economic progress and foreign 
investment, the PAP has laid down an extensive network of political infrastructure to promote these goals. 
The  job  of  promoting  enterprise  and  luring  foreign  direct  investment  was  taken  on  by  the  Economic 
Development Board (EDB, 2018).
The EDB’s daily job was investment promotion, and chairmen of the board were instructed to make 
headlines in order to gain foreign attention. This was done by organizing multiple ceremonies considering 
the opening of industrial estates and factories (song, 2011, p.28). Just as the Ministry of Interior and Defense, 
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the EDB has been influenced by exogenic factors, in this case the state’s trade dependency. The EDB’s policy 
has  namely always been tailored to  its  specific audience of  multinationals  and high-net-worth investors 
across  the  border  (Song,  2011,  pp.30-31).  This  policy  can  be  very  well  explained  by  the  historical 
institutionalist  approach,  as  the  EDB still  does  what  it  was  designed to  do at  its  formation:  promoting 
Singapore’s business climate in order to boost its GDP (Song, 2011, pp.31-32). The institutional structure 
created therefore still influences the state’s foreign policy today. The goal of this policy has, however, always 
been the generation of funds and economic power to combat Singapore’s inherent vulnerability as a small 
state (Song, 2011, pp.27-36; Leifer, 2000, p.20). As Singapore will always keep depending on trade due to its 
territorial size, foreign policy focused on trade is still as meaningful and essential as it was at the beginning 
of independence, despite of the domestic institutional structures present.
To serve Singapore’s economic interests, trade agreements had to be made with other states. Most 
Free Trade Agreements (FTA’s) Singapore has globally, are on a bilateral basis (SingaporeTradeMission, 
2018).  This  is  atypical  as  small  states  have  limited  diplomatic  resources,  and  consequently  would  be 
expected join trade negotiations at international organisations like the World Trade Organization and other 
regional fora. In the case of Singapore, efforts for trade advancement put into international arena are high, as 
can be understood from the state’s efforts to host  the first  WTO conference in 1999 (WTO, 2018).  For 
regional trade deals, the state had been committed to the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
(Ganesan, 2005, p.14). The asian financial crisis however, made cooperation within ASEAN burdensome, 
and the Singaporean government had to seek out other means of obtaining solid trade agreements (Lee, 2011, 
pp. 343-350). The burdensome conduct within ASEAN during the Asian financial crisis can be identified as 
the exogenic  influence that  caused Singapore’s  foreign policy focus to  shift  towards  directly  negotiated 
bilateral trade agreements with other states, without the interference of any international forum (Lee, 2011, 
pp. 343-350; SingaporeTradeMission, 2018). 
By creating these trade agreements with states globally, Singapore has managed to become the asian 
state  with  the  most  FTA’s,  securing  its  global  trading  interests  and  decreasing  the  dependency  on  its 
immediate region. This decreases the risk of sharp asymmetric interdependence with one or a small group of 
states,  improving  Singapore’s  bargaining  position  in  the  global  political  system.  For  the  economic 
relationships to work, Singapore seems to have a strong adherence to liberal ideas of cooperation, on top of 
its competitive realist ideas of military power accumulation (Ganesan, 2005 p.14). 
Finally, the geographical location of the island within Southeast-Asia can be considered an exogenic 
influence on the states foreign policy. Marketing the state internationally as an ideally located hub, perfect 
for reaching out to the rest of Asia, has helped the state gain its pristine economical status (Song, 2011, pp.
30-31) (SingaporeTradeMission, 2018). Attracting investment by marketing the state’s geographical position 
can only be legitimized by Singapore’s ideal location between the strait of Malakka and the South-China Sea, 
positioning it on a node for international shipping routes. The use of the state’s geographical position for 
economical gains can only be explained from a cooperative liberal paradigm. The PAP has used this to its 
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advantage by setting the goal of turning Singapore into a ‘global city’ and accepting the vulnerabilities that 
come with this aspiration. 
Endogenic influences on Singapore’s foreign policy
The first endogenic influence on Singapore’s foreign policy we will analyze is the effect of the first Prime 
Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, on the domestic institutional structures that were created. First and foremost, Lee 
had been in  a  heated debate  with communist  hardliners  within his  PAP (Lee,  1998,  pp.  194-204).  PAP 
radicals, with a Chinese educational background, were enticed by the idea of communism, an ideology that 
did not combine with Lee’s background of British education. The reason Lee had to work together with these 
radicals, however, was to win the majority vote of the largely Chinese population (Lee, 1998, pp.290-292). 
After taking office, he argued that political unity and stability were the only way for a small state to survive, 
thus settling the ongoing feud within the PAP by sidelining the party’s communist hardliners. Lee’s British 
education and struggle with the communist within his party, gave him the tendency to prefer cooperation 
with western states in Europe, and especially the US (Lee, 2011, pp.449-487). This influence is visible in its 
strong  bilateral  relationship  with  the  United  States,  for  both  economic  goals  as  well  as  military  goals. 
Singapore’s  weaponry  arsenal  is  for  example  mostly  purchased  from  the  US  (Ganesan,  2005,  p.8) 
Additionally, Singapore supported the presence of the United States in Southeast-Asia during the Vietnam 
war, and the government stated that only continued cooperation with the US could guarantee safety and 
stability in the region (Ganesan, 2005, p.15). The influence of Lee on Singapore’s foreign policy can be very 
well explained by the historical Institutionalist approach of Elman. Due to Lee’s efforts in creating good ties 
with western countries  including the US,  Singapore’s  bilateral  relations with the US are  still  in  perfect 
condition, regardless of Lee’s presence (U.S. Department of State, 2018). 
The single party system within Singapore can also be viewed as an endogenic influence on the state’s 
foreign policy. The authoritarian style of governance has enabled the state to form long term plans of how 
state survival and vulnerability needs to be addressed. Checks and balances on the government are seen as a 
waste of time and resources, and therefore policy goals can be clearly formulated and strived for. The PAP 
made sure that ministries and contributory boards were designed according to structures of efficiency, and 
ministers were selected on their competence and ability to work together (Lee, 2011, pp.135-145; MFA, 
2018). High positions at the ministry of foreign affairs were only given to PAP confidants, and later, positions 
were  filled  by  specially  trained  civil  servants  and  professional  diplomats  (Ganesan,  2005,  p.12).  Civil 
servants are often trained from a young age, and monitored throughout their career to establish whether they 
would  make   good  employees  of  the  ministry  of  foreign  affairs.  This  careful  selection  has  caused 
professionals to dominate the ministry, making the execution of policy highly efficient. The meritocratic 
system that makes the level of professionalization possible was legitimized by the government as necessary 
means of state survival (Lee, 2011, pp.135-145). This endogenic influence on foreign policy can be perfectly 
described by Elman’s institutionalist approach, as it is the domestic institutional framework that keeps the 
meritocratic system running.
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The last  endogenic influence on foreign policy that  will  be discussed is  the preservation of  the 
internal political order. The economic diplomacy of the Singaporean government, and the accompanying 
prosperity,  is  what  legitimizes the PAP’s single party rule (Leifer,  2000,  pp.27-30).  For this  reason,  the 
safeguarding of good foreign relations and trade does not only sustain the state’s welfare, but also its political 
system and the internal order. Apart from economic prosperity, the state has other foreign policies in place to 
secure internal political order. For example, the Housing and Development Board (HDB) was formed to help 
aid societal development and provide a fair share of welfare to Singapore’s citizens (Lee, 2011, pp.95-96). 
The board’s main goal was to develop affordable yet modern housing estates, in order to combat societal 
dismay by citizens previously living in slums, and to modernize the society as a whole. This board had, 
however,  also foreign policy goals.  By building estates and having control over the sales of homes, the 
Singapore government could realize the distribution of ethnical groups throughout the country. By having 
ethnic quota for HDB housing, all ethnical groups are distributed evenly, to prevent the formation of ethnical 
enclaves (Lee, 2011, pp.95-100). This in turn, makes sure that other states are not easily able to mobilize big 
ethnical  groups  within  Singapore,  decreasing  the  influence  of  other  states  once  more  and  thereby  also 
decreasing  Singapore’s  vulnerability  in  the  region.   The  foreign  policy  flowing  from the  HDB can  be 
explained by the historical institutionalist approach, as ethnical distribution was opted for at the time of 
independence, when internal political order was unstable(Lee, 2011, pp.95-100). Now, even though a stable 
political order has been achieved and in place for more than 50 years, the ethnic quota are still in place to 
influence the spread of ethnicities (HDB, 2018). 
Discussion & conclusion
This thesis was structured around the main research question: Why does Singapore show deviant foreign 
behavior, and can this behavior be explained by the institutionalist framework of Elman? In the research, 
international relations theories, including the institutional framework of Elman, are used to identify both 
exogenic  and endogenic  influences on foreign policy,  in  order  to  answer why Singapore shows deviant 
behavior.
Recapturing the findings in the analysis shows that Singapore’s foreign policy is heavily based on its 
innate vulnerability as a small island state. Although this vulnerability has been battled with heavy military 
investment  creating  a  capable  deterrent  strategy,  and  global  economic  interdependence  creating  an 
unprecedented prosperity, the vulnerability is still articulated by the government. It seems that, even though 
Singapore’s foreign policy has made the city-state able to largely overcome its vulnerabilities, the notion of 
innate  vulnerability  is  paradoxically  still  used  by  the  government  to  legitimize  its  actions.  Apparently, 
continuously  emphasizing state  vulnerability  has  an  effect  of  securitization,  enabling the  state  to  create 
policy that would have otherwise been contested. Combined with the authoritarian nature of the one party 
regime, the PAP can put all resources in effective policy, which in turn completes the cycle, as successful 
policy legitimizes the government. 
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Contrary to the expectations however,  the institutionalist  framework of Elman does not seem to 
provide the complete explanation of Singapore’s foreign policy. Some policy changes, such as Singapore’s 
move from multilateral trade agreements to predominantly bilateral FTA’s, due to the ASEAN’s troublesome 
dynamic during the Asian financial crisis, can not be explained by the historical institutionalist approach. 
Quite on the contrary to Elman’s theoretical predictions, the (neo)realist doctrine appears to form the base of 
the  Singaporean  foreign  policy.  Even  though  the  state  is  small,  it  predominantly  tries  to  counter  its 
vulnerability with the acquisition of military power. Foreign policy aimed at economical development is only 
slightly  based on security  considerations,  which can be  seen in  the  articulation of  the  state’s  values  in 
international organizations like the UN. Additionally, economic development links to the state’s security by 
providing the financial means to pay for the high military spending. Furthermore, economic diplomacy and 
its successes are mainly used by the government to preserve internal political stability and legitimize the 
position and policy output of the People’s Action Party.
Looking back at the expectations, it  can be established that Singapore’s active position in world 
politics  is  actually  — contrary  to  the  expectations  — centered  around its  realist  dedication  to  military 
deterrence and cooperation. The liberal idea of complex interdependence adds to this security, but this does 
not  make  the  dominant  security  strategy  of  the  city-state.  The  asymmetrical  interdependence  with 
neighboring countries we could expect  according to liberalism, has been overcome by an extensive trading 
network that spans the globe. As we did expect, according to both neorealism and liberal institutionalism, 
Singapore  has  an  important  relation  with  international  organizations,  for  protecting  its  sovereign  and 
economic interests, however, these international organizations do not seem to be the dominant providers of 
these interests, as most foreign policy is created on the state’s own initiative. 
The  historical  institutionalist  approach  as  advocated  by  Elman  did  contribute  to  the  detail  of 
Singapore’s foreign policy explanation, however, in itself, it does not suffice to reach a satisfying conclusion. 
Endogenic factors did help in shaping Singapore’s foreign policy, but contrary to the expectations, more 
exogenic than endogenic influences could be distilled, showing that exogenic influences were key in forming 
the Singaporean foreign policy, which corresponds to realist theory.
In conclusion,  the Singaporean government has created a hybrid form of realism and liberalism 
inspired foreign policy in which realism is the dominant theory. This is possible because of the authoritarian 
nature of the state’s single party system and its long term economic planning. The system is legitimized by 
economic  prosperity  and  constantly  accentuating  the  state’s  vulnerability.  Economic  prosperity  in  turn 
enables the state to pay for its military investments. In the case of Singapore, the historic institutionalist 
framework of Elman adds detail to the explanation, but does not create a better indicator of foreign policy 
than classical theories. 
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